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Can Information Reduce Ethnic Discrimination?
Evidence from Airbnb
By Morgane Laouénan and Roland Rathelot∗
We use data from Airbnb to identify the mechanisms underlying
discrimination against ethnic-minority hosts. Within the same
neighbourhood, hosts from minority groups charge 3.2% less for
comparable listings. Since ratings provide guests with increasingly
rich information about a listing’s quality, we can measure the con-
tribution of statistical discrimination, building upon Altonji and
Pierret (2001). We find that statistical discrimination can ac-
count for the whole ethnic price gap: ethnic gaps would disappear
if all unobservables were revealed. Also, three quarters (2.5 points)
of the initial ethnic gap can be attributed to inaccurate beliefs by
potential guests about hosts’ average group quality.
JEL: J15, L85.
Keywords: ethnic discrimination, statistical discrimination, inac-
curate beliefs, rental market, online markets.
Ethnic discrimination is a pervasive phenomenon and understanding which mech-
anisms are at work is needed to design effective policies. In their recent reviews,
Charles and Guryan (2011) and Lang and Lehmann (2012) stress that empirical
attempts to uncover these mechanisms are still inconclusive. This paper takes
advantage of the features of Airbnb, a major online marketplace for short-term
rentals, to measure to what extent information can influence ethnic price gaps.
Airbnb hosts list their property, set the daily price and provide information
about themselves (at least first name and picture) and their properties (precise
location, equipment, local amenities, pictures...). Potential guests book properties
at given dates at the price set by hosts. In this paper, we study the differential
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between prices set by hosts who belong to an ethnic minority and those set by
majority hosts. We ask whether this ethnic price gap that remains unexplained
by differential in observable characteristics is driven by statistical discrimination
or other factors.
While taste-based discrimination stems from the existence of racial preferences
or an aversion towards cross-racial interaction (Becker, 1957), statistical discrimi-
nation is the result of imperfect information and ethnic differences in the mean or
the variance of unobservable characteristics (Phelps, 1972; Arrow, 1973; Aigner
and Cain, 1977). The most direct approach to distinguish statistical discrimi-
nation from other mechanisms is to measure how the ethnic gap varies with the
amount of information about a service (Farber and Gibbons, 1996; Altonji and
Pierret, 2001).
We adapt the Altonji and Pierret (2001) approach to our setting, in which
we observe a measure of the quantity and quality of information about a prop-
erty available to potential guests. In contrast with labour markets, the short-term
rental market is well suited for testing statistical discrimination because (i) trans-
actions happen frequently, compared to changes in the quality of the property,
(ii) ratings and the number of reviews can be observed, (iii) large-sample and
longitudinal data are available. The profiles of new properties contain only self-
reported information. After their stay, guests are allowed to leave a quantitative
rating and a qualitative assessment of both the property and the host. As the
number of reviews grows, more information becomes available to potential guests.
We rely on a simple conceptual framework where the quality of the properties is
partially unobservable. Initially, a property has no reviews and potential guests
can only infer unobservable quality using hosts’ ethnicity, conditional on other
observables. As a property accumulates reviews, potential guests aggregate the
content of reviews and host’s ethnicity to form the best possible guess about the
property’s unobservable quality. From this model, we derive a first test for the
existence of statistical discrimination that relies on the longitudinal nature of the
data. In the presence of statistical discrimination, the price gap should decrease
with the number of reviews and tend to zero, conditional on observables and on
the measure of quality provided by the reviews. If instead the price gap is due
to taste-based discrimination or to ethnic differentials in variables that are not
observable to the econometrician but observable to potential guests, the price gap
should remain stable with the number of reviews.
Guests’ beliefs about unobservable quality do not need to be accurate (Bor-
dalo et al., 2016). If potential guests believe that properties belonging to an
ethnic minority are on average worse than they actually are, an ethnic price gap
will emerge. We categorise this phenomenon as statistical discrimination, as the
gap will disappear when more information about quality becomes available. We
account for inaccurate beliefs in our conceptual framework, and provide an ad-
ditional empirical prediction that allows us to measure its contribution to the
statistical-discrimination component of the ethnic price gap.
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As an illustration, suppose properties held by minority and majority hosts have
the same average quality but potential guests believe that minority listings are
worth 10% less. When properties have no reviews, minority-held properties will
be priced 10% lower. When the number of reviews grows to infinity, the average
price will be identical in both groups. Conversely, imagine now that the average
quality is indeed 10% lower in the minority group, i.e., beliefs are accurate. In
this case, there will be a 10% price gap between the two sets of properties whether
there are few or many reviews. However, if we follow two properties of the same
quality, one held by a minority host, the other one by a majority host, there will be
an initial price gap of 10% that will converge to zero as they accumulate reviews.
Formally, we will use the cross-group differential slope of prices with respect to
the number of reviews to quantify: (i) the ethnic price gap due to statistical
discrimination (when we control for a proxy of the quality of the listing) and (ii)
the part of statistical discrimination that is due to inaccurate beliefs (when we
don’t control for a proxy of the quality of the listing).
Our dataset includes daily prices, characteristics of hosts and properties, as well
as associated reviews. We collected data relating to around 670,000 properties,
corresponding to apartments to rent in 19 cities in North America and Europe.
In total, 21 waves of data, collected between June 2014 and November 2017, form
an unbalanced panel of 3,800,000 observations. The ethnic minority groups we
consider are hosts with Arabic or Muslim first names and hosts categorised as
Black based on their profile pictures.
We find that the within-city raw ethnic price gap is around 16%. The set of
observable characteristics about the property (including its location) is rich and
explains more than 67% of the variance of the price. When the heterogeneity in
observable characteristics is accounted for, the ethnic price gap is reduced to a
significant 3.2%.1 This figure may look small, but a price gap of 3.2% represents
a gap of 17% of the hosts’ surplus, which is substantial.2 We show that prices
increase faster with the number of reviews when the host belongs to an ethnic
minority, conditional on the average rating based on reviews received by the
listing over the whole observation period. We find that 3.4 percentage points of
the price gap (i.e., the whole gap) are accounted for by statistical discrimination.
Of these 3.4 percentage points, 2.5 are due to inaccurate beliefs, that is, to the fact
that potential guests underestimate the average unobservable quality of minority
properties compared to majority ones. The difference, a statistically significant
0.9 percentage point, is due to the true difference in average unobservable quality
between the two groups.
Our paper contributes to the growing but largely inconclusive literature on
the sources of discrimination. Altonji and Pierret (2001) find little evidence for
statistical discrimination in wages on the basis of ethnicity on the U.S. labour
1Edelman and Luca (2014) are the first to document the existence of significant ethnic price gaps on
Airbnb, focusing on the Black-White price gap in New York City.
2We use the estimates from Farronato and Fradkin (2018) for the hosts surplus and average price.
See Section I.C for details.
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market. A strand of literature uses the fact that the relevant outcome is per-
fectly observed ex post. Knowles, Persico and Todd (2001) show that vehicles
of African-Americans are more often searched by the police and that statistical
discrimination explains more than the observed gap.3
The amount and nature of information available to discriminatory agents can
also be manipulated experimentally. On the online rental apartment market,
Ewens, Tomlin and Wang (2014) find the response to differential quality varies in
a way that is consistent with statistical discrimination.4 Cui, Li and Zhang (2020),
in a paper developed independently from ours, send Airbnb accommodation re-
quests expressed by African-American-sounding-name and white-sounding-name
guests in three American cities. They compare requests by guests who have none
vs. one review, and find that both positive and negative reviews reduce the eth-
nic acceptance gap by hosts. Experimental evidence can be complemented by
lab games to separate discrimination mechanisms. In the case of the sportscard
market, List (2004) finds that the lower offers received by minorities are mainly
explained by statistical discrimination.5
Other approaches have been used to separate sources of discrimination. Woz-
niak (2015) shows how a policy (drug-testing legislation) that affects a relevant
dimension of the unobservables (drug use) can provide evidence of statistical
discrimination against low-skilled African-American men. The heterogeneity in
agents’ prejudice, whether revealed or assumed, is sometimes used to infer which
source of discrimination is more prevalent. Bayer et al. (2017) show that the
minority home-buyers pay higher prices in the U.S. housing market regardless of
the sellers’ ethnicity, suggesting statistical discrimination. Zussman (2013) finds
that the discrimination towards Arabs on an online market for used cars in Is-
rael is not related to sellers’ revealed attitudes towards Arabs. Doleac and Stein
(2013) show that online iPod ads featuring dark-skinned hands receive fewer of-
fers, with poorer outcomes in thin markets and those with higher racial isolation
and crime.6
Following Bordalo et al. (2016), a recent literature has attempted to go beyond
the dichotomy between taste-based and statistical discrimination. Customers
may have inaccurate beliefs about sellers’ quality, which itself could be due to
stereotypes. To our knowledge, few papers have tried to isolate this source of
3Using data from a peer-to-peer lending website, Pope and Sydnor (2011) find that African-Americans
are likely to be subject to statistical discrimination. Using data from television game shows, Anwar (2012)
finds that white contestants believe that Afro-Americans have lower skill levels while Levitt (2004) and
Antonovics, Arcidiacono and Walsh (2005) find no evidence of discrimination.
4Conversely, in their correspondence studies on the U.S. and Canadian labour markets, Bertrand and
Mullainathan (2004) and Oreopoulos (2011) find that adding information or enhancing resumes do not
benefit minority applicants. Heckman (1998) and Neumark (2018) list some of the challenges associated
with the current use of experimental methods for discrimination.
5See also Fershtman and Gneezy (2001) and Castillo and Petrie (2010) for papers using lab experi-
ments for this purpose.
6Taking the opposite approach, Charles and Guryan (2008) introduce an indirect test of the Becker
prejudice model based on associations between prejudice and wages and find that around one quarter
of the unconditional racial wage gap is due to prejudice, while the three other quarters can be due to
differences in unobservables or other forms of discrimination.
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differentials from other discriminatory mechanisms. Arnold, Dobbie and Yang
(2018) and Dobbie et al. (2018) isolate “inaccurate stereotyping” from racial an-
imus in the context of bail decisions and consumer lending, and find that this
mechanism explains a large part of the racial bias. In our setting, we classify
ethnic gaps coming from inaccurate beliefs as statistical discrimination because
new information will reduce these gaps. Bohren, Imas and Rosenberg (2019)
design a randomised experiment on a maths forum to measure the dynamics of
discrimination against women, allowing for ”belief-based” discrimination.
We also contribute to the growing literature on the role of information provided
by online market intermediaries on markets’ outcomes.7 Our paper is related to
Autor and Scarborough (2008), who show that, while minorities perform poorly on
job tests, introducing job-testing in a large retail firm has no impact on minority
hiring. We contribute to the study of ethnic discrimination on the rental market
by the unprecedented scale of our data, covering 19 cities in 8 countries both
in Europe and North America. This online marketplace Airbnb (2014-2017) is
relevant in itself from an economic point of view: launched in 2008, the website
offers more than 7,000,000 listings in 220 different countries and claims to have
served over 750 million guests.8
Section 1 presents the context, the data and the first empirical evidence about
ethnic price gaps. Section 2 introduces our conceptual framework. Section 3
presents our empirical strategy and our main results. Section 4 provides additional
results and discusses alternative explanations. Section 5 concludes.
I. Context and Data
A. Description of the platform
Airbnb connects hosts looking for opportunities to let their properties and po-
tential guests looking for a place to stay. Both types of users have to register and
provide a large set of information about themselves. Hosts also have to provide
information about their properties. In practical terms, potential guests usually
start by typing the city where and when they want to stay on the search en-
gine. They can filter the results of the search according to the price, or other
characteristics (e.g., accommodation capacity, room type, property type, number
of bedrooms). At that stage, potential guests obtain a list of results with basic
information, among which the daily price, a picture of the property, a thumbnail
photo of the host and the overall rating (presented in stars and defined as the
average rating over the reviews of the listing). When they click on one of the
listings, they have access to more detailed information, notably the first name of
the host, a detailed description of the property, a standardised list of the offered
7See e.g. Autor (2001, 2009); Bagues and Labini (2009); Pallais (2014); Horton (2017); Pallais and
Sands (2016); Brown, Setren and Topa (2016); Stanton and Thomas (2018).
8https://news.airbnb.com/fast-facts/
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amenities, more pictures and detailed reviews from previous guests.9
Hosts can revise the price of their properties at any moment. The potential
guest decides which place she prefers among those available during the period
selected and commits by clicking on the ”Book It” button. The decision is then
in the hands of the host. She can accept or reject the guest, without any justifi-
cation.10 A guest who gets rejected receives an email encouraging her to look for
another place. The rejection is not reported on her profile. If the host accepts
the guest, the deal is concluded and there is no way to modify its terms.11 The
potential guest may decide to cancel her booking. In this case, the terms of the
cancellation policy (specified on the listing) apply: depending on the flexibility
of the policy, penalties of different amounts are charged. The host may also de-
cide to cancel the deal. In this case, there is no financial penalty, but there is a
reputation cost: the website records on the host’s profile that she has cancelled a
deal.
We consider hereafter that potential guests are price-takers. Using a simple
model of supply and demand, we consider that the existence of discrimination
towards hosts, which triggers a shift in demand, should translate into lower prices.
We formalize this idea in the section dedicated to the conceptual framework.
B. Data
We collect data from publicly available webpages of the marketplace. We store
all information visible on the first page of the listing: the price asked by the host,
the characteristics of the listing, the characteristics of the host and the last 10
reviews and ratings. We focus on the 19 cities in North America and Europe
with the highest number of listings.12 We repeat the collection process every 2-3
weeks between June 2014 and June 2015, and add a last wave in November 2017,
obtaining 21 waves in total.13 Our sample includes 663,090 distinct properties.
The panel is unbalanced: some properties enter the system and others exit.14
We restrict our analysis on the sub-sample of listings that have gained at least
one review over the observation period. The motivation behind this restriction
is to work with active listings, where there has been established transactions and
feedback from the guests. This restriction reduces the sample size from 663,090
9See Figure A1 for a screenshot of a listing corresponding to the period of the data we use.
10Rejections are frequent; see Fradkin (2017).
11While the acceptance/rejection decision would in itself be of interest as regards discrimination, we
do not have the necessary data to study that side of the market. See Edelman, Luca and Svirsky (2017)
for a field study about discrimination against potential guests.
12The cities are: London, Paris, Madrid, Barcelona, Rome, Milan, Florence, Amsterdam, Berlin,
Marseille, Vancouver, Toronto, Montreal, Boston, New York City, Miami, Chicago, San Francisco and
Los Angeles. See Appendix Table A1 for the number of observations and listings by city.
13See the collection dates of each wave in Appendix Table A2. The last wave was added because we
wanted to increase the longitudinal depth of our dataset.
14We check the possibility of differential attrition between ethnic groups. In Appendix Section C,
we show that the probability to leave the market is the same for minority and majority groups, after
controlling for property characteristics, ratings and neighbourhood fixed-effects.
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to 220,939: most Airbnb listings do not get any review during that period (or
exit before they do). The distribution of the number of waves during which we
observe each property is in Appendix Figure A2: 13% of listings are observed in
at least 20 waves and half of listings are observed at least 11 waves.
For each property, we know the main characteristics: the type of property,
the size, the type of bed, amenities, services and rules. Most properties are
apartments and the entire place is let in 70% of cases. Properties are rather
small, with 1.2 bedrooms on average, and they can host on average three guests.
Some properties add a cleaning fee and charge for additional people. We count
the cleaning fee directly into the price in order to obtain the final price paid by the
guest.15 We also obtain some information about the hosts on their profile pages.
Aside from the first name, a picture and a free-text description, potential guests
know whether hosts have other properties and when they joined the platform.
Most hosts have only one property and have joined the platform recently. See the
full list of characteristics of the properties and the hosts in Appendix Table A3.
Figure 1 shows the distribution of daily prices. There is much variation in
prices across properties. To reduce the influence of outliers, we drop 1% of the
observations at the top and the bottom of the price distribution. The first quarter
is $75, the median $107 and the third quarter $160 per night. The skewness of
the distribution implies that the mean price is $130. The daily price varies across
cities and according to the amenities of the listing (number of accommodates,
bedrooms, bathrooms...). Appendix Table A4 provides details on how amenities
affect the price.
In order to identify statistical discrimination, we need to have enough vari-
ability in the number of reviews and we need reviews to be informative about
listings’ quality. Appendix Figure A3 displays the distribution of reviews across
the observations of our sample (left panel) and the variation of the number of
reviews between the last and the first observations (right panel) and shows that
the sample offers a decent amount of heterogeneity in the number of reviews.
For each property, we use the last observed rating, which represents the average
of all ratings received over its lifetime on Airbnb. Ratings can vary between 1 and
5 stars (with half-star increments), and the distribution is skewed towards good
ratings, as documented in Fradkin, Grewal and Holtz (2018). If we consider the
last rating observed for each property of our sample, 44% of observations have 5
stars and 39% 4.5 stars. By contrast, only 4% have 3.5 stars or less (see Appendix
Table A5).
C. Ethnic groups and gaps
We consider two groups of ethnic minorities. First, we consider Blacks, which
we identify using the pictures provided on their host profile.16 Second, we con-
15We assume guests stay on average six days, and add a sixth of the fee to the price.
16Specifically, pictures were coded by workers specialised in this picture-coding task. Workers were
asked to code each picture in three categories: (i) whether they thought that at least one person in the
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Figure 1. Distribution of daily price
Note: This figure shows the distribution of the final price (cleaning fees included) represented through
100 bins. The sample is restricted to listings that have gained at least one review over the observation
period. The figure is right truncated with a maximum of 500$.
sider hosts that have a first name associated with Arabic, Muslim or Sub-Saharan
African ethnicity (labeled Arabic/Muslim hereafter).17 We use two different
sources to obtain a complete list of names: Jouniaux (2001) and Hawramani
(2015).18 Table 1 displays the share of ethnic groups in the sample and the price
gap, controlling for interacted dummies for the city and the wave of observation
(i.e. within-city-wave price gap). Blacks living in North America represent 2%
of the observations and those living in Europe 0.9%. Hosts with Arabic/Muslim
names in North America represent 1.3% of the sample and those in Europe 2.1%
of the sample. Compared to their share in total population (both in North Amer-
ica & Europe), ethnic minorities seem to be under-represented on the website. A
possible explanation is that only those with a fairly good-quality property may
attempt to rent on Airbnb, which would induce a positive selection. Overall, the
share of minorities is 6.2%, but this share varies across cities. NYC has 9.8% of
African-American and 3.7% of Arabic/Muslim observations. London and Paris
both have around 5% of Arabic/Muslim observations, while this group represents
less than 1% of the observations in Milan and Rome. The raw price gap for Ara-
picture was African-American, (ii) whether nobody in the picture was African-American, (iii) whether it
was impossible to say anything about the ethnicity of anyone in the picture or the picture was not showing
any human being (pictures of flats, pets, furniture, landscape...). We created one dummy variable equal
to one in the first case. In order to check their results, we selected random samples and found mistakes
at a rate below 5% for this dummy variable. In Appendix Section D, we provide suggestive evidence that
minority hosts do not seem to strategically obfuscate their skin colour.
17See Rubinstein and Brenner (2014) for an example of discrimination based on names.
18The list of Arabic/Muslim names we used is available in the data appendix.
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bic/Muslim hosts, controlling only for the heterogeneity across cities and waves, is
around 5% in North America and 7% in Europe. For Blacks, the raw gap reaches
31% in North America and 26% in Europe.
Table 1— Raw price gaps by ethnic groups
Sample size Share Within-city-wave gap
Majority 2,320,285 93.8% -
Blacks (US/Can) 49,706 2.0% 31.3%
Blacks (Europe) 21,365 0.9% 26.3%
Arabic/Muslim (US/Can) 31,145 1.3% 4.7%
Arabic/Muslim (Europe) 52,050 2.1% 6.8%
Note: The within-city-wave gaps are obtained as the coefficients on the dummies of each group in a
linear regression of the log-price that includes dummies for the interaction of each city and each wave.
Table 2 shows the ethnic price differential for several specifications. The first
column displays within-city-wave raw differential in daily log-prices: only differ-
ences in cities and waves are taken into account, no differences in characteristics.
The raw ethnic gap is large (17%) and highly significant. Accounting for ethnic
disparities in property observable characteristics reduces the gap to 11% (col-
umn 2), which shows that ethnic minorities have on average properties of lower
observable quality. Characteristics include all information provided by the host
concerning her listing and her profile. The overall number of pictures and the
number of pictures taken by professionals are also taken into account in our es-
timation.19 Observable characteristics explain a large part of the variance: the
adjusted R-squared jumps to .63 in the second column.
A major source of heterogeneity across listings is their location. Airbnb does
not publicise the exact coordinates of a given listing, but rather a .3 mile-radius
circle. We build a grid of blocks that are .6 miles large for all cities and as-
sign each listing to the block where the centroid of its circle is located. On top
of this, Airbnb assigns listings to the neighbourhood they belong to. In total,
we work with 6,700 squared blocks and 1,500 neighbourhoods. Throughout the
paper, controlling for the listing’s location means that we control for both the
block and the neighbourhood where the listing is located. Appendix Table A6
shows the number of neighbourhoods and blocks per city. The ratio of blocks per
neighbourhood mainly depends on the area and the density of the city.
Including neighbourhood and block fixed-effects reduces the ethnic price gap
from 17% to 7% (column 3) and the adjusted R-squared increases from .15 to
.36. Finally, in the fourth column, both location and property characteristics are
19We identify the number of ”verified photos” on each listing. Verified photos mean a profes-
sional Airbnb photographer visited the listing, captured and uploaded the photos. Airbnb contracts
the photographers and the photography service is free for hosts. More information can be found at
https://airbnb.com/info/photography
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included in the regression: the residual ethnic price gap is reduced to 3.2% but
is still very significant. The adjusted R-squared is high in this last specification,
equal to .73. Compared to the unexplained ethnic wage gaps found on labour
markets, a figure of 3.2% may look small. To make sense of it, one has to compare
it to the average surplus that hosts realise on Airbnb. Working on the 50 largest
US cities, Farronato and Fradkin (2018) find that hosts enjoy an average of $26
in surplus per night booked for an average price of $136. A 3.2% ethnic price gap
represents a loss of $4.4 per night, i.e. a 17% ethnic differential in surplus.20
Table 2—Ethnic price gap, by specification
Log daily rate
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Minority -0.169*** -0.111*** -0.067*** -0.032***
(0.008) (0.005) (0.009) (0.006)
City-wave FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Neighbourhood FE No No Yes Yes
Block FE No No Yes Yes
Property characteristics No Yes No Yes
Adj R2 0.15 0.63 0.36 0.73
N obs. 2,474,551 2,474,551 2,474,551 2,474,551
Notes: OLS regression on the daily log-price on the minority dummy, controlling city-wave fixed-
effects. See the list of all property characteristics in Table A4. Robust standard errors clustered at
the property level.
Table 3 shows the coefficient associated to the ethnic minority dummy in a
regression of the log-price on property characteristics, neighbourhood dummies
and ratings, on several subsamples defined by the number of reviews. We find
that the point estimates differ across subsamples: from 3.4% for listings with
no reviews to an insignificant 2% for listings with more than 49 reviews. These
results are suggestive of the existence of statistical discrimination if reviews bring
information that help offset the ethnic price gap. However, there are two caveats
about this interpretation. First, we don’t have the statistical power to reject the
null hypothesis that all five coefficients are equal. Second, there is a potential
sample bias: properties with no reviews are likely to be different from those with
more than 49 reviews. In the remainder of the paper, we introduce a conceptual
framework leading to an empirical test of statistical discrimination that leverages
the longitudinal dimension of our data.
20Our framework (see infra) allows the remaining 3.2% gap to be explained by the uneven distribution
of unobservables across ethnic groups. Thus, we refrain from using a test à la Altonji, Elder and Taber
(2005).
VOL. VOL NO. ISSUECAN INFORMATION REDUCE ETHNIC DISCRIMINATION? EVIDENCE FROM AIRBNB11
Table 3—Ethnic price gap, for several segments of the number of reviews
Log daily rate
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Minority -0.034*** -0.026*** -0.023*** -0.022** -0.021
(0.009) (0.007) (0.009) (0.011) (0.015)
Nb reviews 0 1-4 5-19 20-49 50+
Minority share 6.1% 6.2% 6.3% 6.3% 6.1%
Adj R2 0.72 0.75 0.78 0.79 0.80
N obs. 351,631 808,000 789,798 352,906 172,216
Notes: OLS regressions of the daily log-price on the minority dummy, controlling for neighbourhood
FE, block FE property characteristics and ratings (for properties with at least one review). See
the list of all property and host characteristics in Table A4. Robust standard errors clustered at
the property level.
II. Conceptual framework
In this section, we present a simple conceptual framework where ethnic price
gaps can be due to statistical discrimination, taste-based discrimination, ethnic
differentials in characteristics unobserved by the econometrician but observed by
potential guests, and ethnic differentials in outside options.
A. Prices and demand as a function of quality
At each period (say, a week), a host shares her working time between two
activities: renting her property (looking for guests, communicating with guests,
cleaning up) or working on a regular job. L is the amount of labour dedicated to
renting and 1 − L to the regular job. Renting the property is assumed to have
decreasing returns to scale: the number of nights supplied is equal to Lα̃, with
α̃ ∈ (0, 1). The regular job has constant returns to scale. Given the price of
a night P and the wage of the regular job W , the revenue of the host over the
period is: PLα̃ +W (1− L).
From the point of view of potential guests in a particular market, properties
differ in three dimensions: quality Q, price P and the ethnicity of the host m
(equal to 1 if the host belongs to an ethnic minority, 0 otherwise). Demand D
for a particular property is assumed to increase with Q, decrease with P . Taste-
based discrimination is embedded in this framework: demand is assumed to be
divided by Γ > 1 when m = 1, relatively to m = 0. Assuming β and κ are strictly




Taking Q and m as given, hosts can set the price P and the effort L they
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dedicate to renting to maximize their profit, under the demand constraint:
max
P
PD(P ) + (1−D1/α̃(P ))W with D(P ) = Q
β
P κΓm
Solving the program, hosts will set the log-price such that:
(1) p = p0 + λαw + λβq − λγm
where p = logP , w = logW , q = logQ, γ = log Γ, α = α̃1−α̃ , λ = (κ + α)
−1,
p0 = λα log(
α̃(κ−1)
κ ).
B. Imperfectly observed quality
Potential guests cannot observe quality perfectly. They have an information set
which contains everything that the website displays about the listing (description,
pictures, host ethnicity, and ratings, if any). We assume that quality q is the sum
of two components orthogonal from each other: q = ζ + ν. ζ is immediately
observable in the listing by potential guests, while ν is unobservable when the
listing has no reviews but perfectly observable when it has an infinite number of
reviews.
We assume that the distribution of the quality component inferred from reviews
conditional on ethnicity ν|m is a N (ν̄m, σ2ν).21 Each review transmits a signal,
which is a random draw around ν in a normal distribution, the error on a single
review being of variance σ2.22 Potential guests observe r, the average signal
transmitted by the set ofK existing reviews, which is distributed as aN (ν, σ2/K).
Denoting ρ = σ2/σ2ν , the expected ν for a listing with average r, K reviews and
host ethnicity m is the weighted average between the prior ν̄m and the signal r:
E(ν|r,K,m) = Kr + ρν̄m
K + ρ
From the point of view of potential guests, the expected quality of a listings
with K reviews, a signal r, a host ethnicity m and observable characteristics ζ is:
E(q|ζ, r,K,m) = ζ + Kr + ρν̄m
K + ρ
In a context where quality is not perfectly observed, the host will combine
21In Appendix Section E, we show that we can obtain a similar expression for the expectation of the
price when we assume, more realistically, that ν follows a non-normal prior distribution (beta distribu-
tion).
22This assumption is not obvious. Reviews may depend not only on the quality but also on prices.
We abstract from this aspect to simplify.
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the expected quality conditional on the information set of potential guests with
equation (1) to form the price-setting rule:
(2) p = p0 − λγm+ λαw + λβζ + λβ
Kr + ρν̄m
K + ρ
III. Empirical strategy and results
In this section, we first derive empirical predictions from the theoretical frame-
work in order to identify statistical discrimination from the other mechanisms.
Second, we show how we can separate the part of the statistical-discrimination
ethnic price gap that corresponds to differences in true average unobservable qual-
ity from the part that corresponds to inaccurate beliefs. Finally, we present the
estimation results.
A. Identification strategy when beliefs are accurate
We assume that the econometrician observes for each listing i a sequence of
prices pit at different dates t, the associated number of reviews Kit, listing char-
acteristics Xit, the host’s ethnicity mi, and the last known average rating r̄i. We
assume that, conditional on a listing fixed-effects and Xit, the variability in prices
over time does not come from variations in features ζ, or the outside option w.
Prediction 0 (accurate beliefs).. — Under the previous set of assumptions, our
main empirical prediction is that the non-linear regression with listing fixed effects
specified in equation (3) will allow the econometrician to identify βm = λβ(ν̄1 −
ν̄0), the ethnic price gap that can be attributed to statistical discrimination, as
well as ρ, the number of reviews that is necessary to make up for half of the gap










+ µi +Xitβx + εit
Once we control for the time evolution of prices that corresponds to listings of
quality r̄i (where Supp(r̄) is the set of all possible values of r̄i), the specific time
evolution of prices of listings of minority hosts reveals the extent of statistical
discrimination. If minority hosts have on average listings that have worse unob-
servables than majority hosts, ν̄1 < ν̄0, we have βm < 0. Intuitively, all minority
hosts have to post lower prices initially to compensate for lower expectations from
the demand side. Within bins of listings of the same quality, the price of listings
belonging to minority hosts will increase faster with the number of reviews than
those belonging to majority hosts. As information about ν becomes more accu-
rate, the price of minority-host listings will catch up and converge towards the
price of their majority-host counterparts.
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Note that, within this framework, we cannot disentangle the other possible
channels causing ethnic price gaps. Differences in unobservables that do not evolve
with reviews (ζ), differences in outside option (w), and taste-based discrimination
(γ) are pooled together and absorbed by the listing fixed effects.
B. Identification strategy when beliefs are inaccurate
So far, we have assumed that potential guests have accurate beliefs and that sta-
tistical discrimination exists because the average quality of the listings proposed
by minorities is lower than those proposed by the majority (ν̄1 < ν̄0). Here, we
relax the assumption that guests have accurate beliefs about the average quality
ν̄ in each group. For simplicity, let us assume that potential guests make no
mistake on the average quality ν̄0 of listings held by majority hosts. However,
their prior on the average quality ν̃1 might differ from the true average quality
ν̄1. For instance, guests might wrongly believe that minority listings are worse
on average than they actually are (ν̄1 − ν̃1 > 0).
When beliefs are allowed to be inaccurate, we can decompose the term ν̄0 − ν̃1
that we attribute to statistical discrimination into two components. The first one
ν̄0 − ν̄1 is due to the difference in the true average unobservable quality across
groups. The second one ν̄1 − ν̃1 is due to the difference between the average true
unobservable quality and the (potentially inaccurate) beliefs that potential guests
hold about it.
Predictions 1 and 2 (inaccurate beliefs).. — Under this new, more general,
set of assumptions, our first empirical prediction is that the regression specified
in equation (3) will allow the econometrician to identify βm = λβ(ν̃1 − ν̄0), the
ethnic price gap that can be attributed to statistical discrimination, as well as ρ.
Our second empirical prediction is that the non-linear regression with listing
fixed effects in which we do not include the interaction terms between ratings
dummies 1{r̄i = r̄} and the evolution in the number of reviews KitKit+ρ , as specified
in equation (4), will allow the econometrician to identify β̃m = λβ(ν̃1 − ν̄1), the
ethnic price gap that can be attributed to inaccurate beliefs, as well as ρ. Proofs
are in Appendix Section F.






+ µi +Xitβx + εit
Whenever beliefs are correct (ν̃1 = ν̄1), the estimate of β̃m in equation (4)
should be equal to 0, while the estimate of βm in equation (3) will be equal to
ν̄1− ν̄0. When ν̃1 = ν̄1, potential guests are right, on average, about the property
quality in each group. When we do not control by the price evolution specific to
ratings’ levels, the prices of minority-owned listings will evolve at the same pace
as those of the majority.
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On the contrary, when both groups have the same true average quality (ν̄1 = ν̄0)
but potential guests have inaccurate beliefs (ν̃1 < ν̄1), the estimate of βm in
equation (3) and the estimate of β̃m in equation (4) should be equal to each other
and strictly positive. In the empirical subsection below, we will report βm, the
total statistical-discrimination gap, β̃m the ethnic gap due to inaccurate beliefs
and βm − β̃m the ethnic gap due to differences in the true average quality.
Where could inaccurate beliefs come from? Listings on Airbnb are a selected
subset from all homes. Most likely, hosts self-select into Airbnb based on the
quality of their homes, and it is possible that minority listings are even more
selected, given that ethnic minorities tend to live in areas and properties that are
less valued by guests. This differential selection may induce a gap between the
guests’ beliefs about unobservables and actual quality for minority listings. This
hypothesis is consistent with the fact that the share of minorities on Airbnb is
smaller than their share in the whole population. Another way to explain why
potential guests, who are primarily from the majority group, have unduly low
beliefs about the quality of minority hosts’ listing is provided by the model of
stereotypes in Bordalo et al. (2016).
C. Main empirical results
We estimate regressions (3) and (4), using four values for the support of the last
observed average rating (5, 4.5, 4, and ≤ 3.5 stars), including listing fixed effects.
We use all property characteristics as well as city dummies interacted with the
wave in which the listing appears. We estimate the main parameters of interest:
βm, β̃m and ρ. For inference, we bootstrap at the property level.
We present the estimation results in Table 4. In the first column, we show the
results of regression (3). The point estimate for the total ethnic gap corresponding
to statistical discrimination is 3.4%. This figure is similar to the ethnic price gap
observed in the subset of listings with no reviews (3.4%, see Table 3, column 1).
This point estimate suggests that the whole initial price gap can be accounted for
by statistical discrimination. In other words, when the number of reviews tends
to infinity, the price gap between a property held by a minority host and one of
the same quality held by a majority will converge to zero.
In the second column of Table 4, we show the results of regression (4). The
component of statistical discrimination corresponding to inaccurate beliefs is es-
timated to be equal to 2.5%. We interpret this result as evidence that roughly
three quarters (i.e., 2.5/3.4) of the gap due to statistical discrimination is driven
by inaccurate beliefs, and one quarter (.9/3.4) by differences in average unobserv-
able quality. Potential guests may either be overestimating the average quality of
listings by majority hosts, or underestimating the average quality of those held
by minority hosts. The true average unobservable quality of minority and ma-
jority listings is very similar, and creates a price gap of less than 1%, while the
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inaccurate beliefs of potential guests is responsible for most of the gap.23 These
inaccurate beliefs are corrected by new information about the quality of listings
coming from reviews, which is in practice very different from what taste-based
discrimination would generate.
We find that ρ is equal to 14. ρ can be interpreted as the number of reviews
necessary to reveal half of the relevant information about the unobservables of a
listing. If p is the price of a property in the absence of reviews and p the price
when all the information is revealed, the price (p+ p)/2 is reached in expectation
after ρ reviews. On average, 14 reviews are required to correct the ethnic gap for
half of the component due to statistical discrimination.
Table 4—Non-linear model of log-prices as a function of the number of reviews
(1) (2)
5 stars ×f(K) 0.115***
(0.002)
4.5 stars ×f(K) 0.062***
(0.002)
4 stars ×f(K) -0.005
(0.003)








N obs. 2,474,551 2,474,551
Note: Estimations by non-linear least-squares of equations (3) and (4). The outcome is the daily log-
price. Stars represent the last known average rating for a listing. Minority is an indicator that identifies
the minority host, i.e. mi = 1. f(Kit) =
Kit
Kit+ρ
where Kit is the number of reviews for listing i at
time t and ρ is the number of reviews that is necessary to make up for half of the gap due to statistical
discrimination. Values in row Minority ×f(K) are estimates of the coefficients on the term mi KitKit+ρ .
Under our assumptions, the interaction m × f(K) is an estimate of −βm (the total ethnic gap due
to statistical discrimination) in column (1), and of −β̃m (the part of statistical discrimination due to
inaccurate beliefs) in column (2). On top of covariates included in the table, we include neighbourhood
fixed effects, block fixed effects and property/host characteristics. See the list of all property and host
characteristics in Appendix Table A4. Inference by block-bootstrap at the listing level.
23Block-bootstrapping the estimation, we find that the 95% confidence interval of βm is [0.014,0.054],
the CI of β̃m is [0.005,0.046], and the CI of βm − β̃m is [0.006,0.010].
VOL. VOL NO. ISSUECAN INFORMATION REDUCE ETHNIC DISCRIMINATION? EVIDENCE FROM AIRBNB17
IV. Additional results
In this section, we first present two additional pieces of evidence in support of
our main empirical strategy. We show that our results are robust to more flexible
or different functional form assumptions on the relationship between log-prices
and the number of reviews. Second, we present results by subsamples. Finally,
we provide empirical elements that lead us to argue against alternative stories
that could explain why minority prices increase faster than majority ones in the
absence of statistical discrimination.
A. Robustness
In this subsection, we present additional results that do not rely on imposing
the KK+ρ functional form on the relationship between the number of reviews and
prices. We estimate a within-listing price model where the number of reviews






If reviews matter and ratings provide some information about unobserved quality,
we should have βr > βr′ if r > r
′, what we have checked above with a more
flexible specification. In the presence of statistical discrimination, we should have
βm,1 > 0. The
K
K+ρ functional form also implies that the relationship between
the number of reviews and prices is concave, so that βm,2 < 0.
Table 5 presents the results of the estimation of this model. Columns (1) and
(2) show the estimation results for a linear specification, in which we restrict
the sample to observations with less than 40 and 60 reviews. In column (3), we
present the results for the quadratic specification. The results are all consistent
with those of the previous section. The higher the final rating, the faster prices
grow with the number of reviews. The slope of the relationship is higher for
hosts belonging to the minority group. The quadratic specification shows that
the relationship is indeed concave.
B. The relationship between prices and reviews: non-parametric estimation
Another way to support our empirical strategy is to show that the relationship
between prices and reviews, irrespective of hosts’ ethnicity, is compatible with
the function KK+ρ . Do we observe such a pattern in our data? Restricting our
sample to properties held by majority hosts, we regress the log-price on splines of
the number of reviews interacted with the last rating (5, 4.5, 4, and 3.5 stars and
less) and the full set of characteristics of the properties. The spline specification
allows us to flexibly accommodate any form of the relationship between prices
and the number of reviews.
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Table 5—Robustness: Linear and quadratic models of price with listing fixed effects
log-price
(1) (2) (3)
3.5 stars ×K/100 -0.145** -0.137*** -0.168**
(0.058) (0.052) (0.085)
4 stars ×K/100 -0.133*** -0.132*** -0.134***
(0.023) (0.019) (0.035)
4.5 stars ×K/100 0.048*** 0.014* 0.133***
(0.010) (0.008) (0.014)
5 stars ×K/100 0.185*** 0.114*** 0.295***
(0.011) (0.008) (0.015)
Minority ×K/100 0.090** 0.060** 0.120***
(0.036) (0.027) (0.045)
3.5 stars ×(K/100)2 0.154
(0.154)
4 stars ×(K/100)2 0.082
(0.053)
4.5 stars ×(K/100)2 -0.193***
(0.018)




Samples K<40 K<60 K<80
N obs. 1,883,500 1,996,554 2,051,820
Note: OLS regressions with listing fixed effects. Stars represent the last known average ratings and K
is the number of reviews. Aside from those mentioned in the Table, controls include city-wave FE and




1{r̄i = r̄}sr(Kit) + µi +Xitβx + εit
where pit is the log-price of property i at wave t, K is the number of reviews, X
are observable characteristics of the property and the host, sr̄(.) are piecewise-
linear splines that are specific to each level of the last rating r̄ and µ are property
fixed-effects. The results of the estimation are displayed in Figure 2.
The figure shows that, depending on the last rating, prices diverge in a way that
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Figure 2. Estimated prices with the number of reviews, stratified by the most recent average
rating
Note: Equation (6) was estimated by linear regression with property fixed effects. We use linear splines
with knots at 5, 10, 20, 30 and 50 reviews. The sample is restricted to listings with majority hosts. We
plot the estimates ŝr(.) for all values of r, with the normalization ŝr(0) = 0. The number of observations
of properties with ratings 3.5 or lower is very small when the number of reviews is higher than 30 and
we do not report the corresponding estimates.
is close to the functional form predicted by our conceptual framework, displayed
in Appendix Figure A4. This result supports our assumptions that: (i) reviews
provide information to potential guests, (ii) hosts use reviews and information
to update their prices, and (iii) the functional form between log-prices and the
number of reviews conditional on the last rating looks like KK+ρ .
C. Heterogeneity
In Table 6, we perform the main analysis on several sub-samples, according to
the ethnic minority group (African-American vs. Arabic/Muslim), the continent
(North-America vs. Europe), and the nature of the listing (entire property vs.
shared property). For each sample or specification, we report in Panel A the
estimates of βm and ρ, from equation (3). Panel B shows the unexplained price
gap on the sample of properties with no reviews.
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In most cases, the point estimate of βm is of the same magnitude as the ethnic
price gap for non-reviewed listings. According to our model, the ethnic price gap
is maximum at zero review and decreases once information is revealed. Statistical
discrimination seems to be higher for Black than for Arabic/Muslim hosts. There
is no significant difference in the extent of statistical discrimination between Eu-
rope and North America. Comparing shared flats with entire flats is intuitively
interesting. A possible hypothesis is that shared flats involve a more substantial
amount of interaction between hosts and guests than entire flats (where, some-
times, hosts and guests hardly meet). Our analysis show that shared flats tend
to have higher statistical discrimination than entire flats. We also find that infor-
mation is more difficult to collect for shared flats (ρ being roughly twice larger)
than for entire flats. This is consistent with the fact that the set of observables
is larger (including how friendly the host is, for instance).
Table 6—Results on sub-samples
Full Arabic Blacks US Europe Shared Entire
Sample Muslims Canada Flat Flat
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Panel A. Estimation of the main model
Minority ×f(K) 0.034*** 0.019*** 0.049*** 0.029*** 0.037*** 0.082*** 0.013**
(0.006) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.008) (0.012) (0.006)
ρ 14 14 12 10 17 22 12
(0.3) (0.3) (0.3) (0.4) (0.4) (0.9) (0.3)
Panel B. Unexplained ethnic price gap (non-reviewed listings)
Minority -0.034*** -0.036*** -0.25* -0.020* -0.049*** -0.034** -0.038***
(0.009) (0.010) (0.013) (0.012) (0.012) (0.015) (0.010)
Adj R2 0.72 0.72 0.73 0.76 0.70 0.59 0.68
Minority share 6.1% 3.8% 3.4% 8.7% 4.8% 7.8% 5.5%
N obs. 351,631 342,988 270,896 119,506 232,125 99,087 252,544
Note: In Panel A, estimations by non-linear least-squares following the specification adopted in Table
4, column 1. Minority is an indicator that identifies the minority host, i.e. mi = 1. f(Kit) =
Kit
Kit+ρ
where Kit is the number of reviews for listing i at time t and ρ is the number of reviews that is necessary
to make up for half of the gap due to statistical discrimination. Values in row Minority ×f(K) are
estimates of the coefficients on the term mi
Kit
Kit+ρ
. Under our assumptions, the interaction m× f(K) is
an estimate of −βm (the total ethnic gap due to statistical discrimination). On top of covariates included
in the table, we include neighbourhood fixed effects, block fixed effects and property/host characteristics.
See the list of all property and host characteristics in Appendix Table A4. Inference by block-bootstrap
at the listing level. In Panel B, OLS regressions following the specification adopted in Table 3, column 1:
daily log-price on the minority dummy when the number of reviews is null, controlling for neighbourhood
FE and block FE property characteristics.
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D. Do ethnic groups compete on the same market?
So far, we have made the implicit assumption that minority and majority hosts
compete on the same market. In this section, we investigate whether markets
are also segmented: minority hosts receiving almost only guests of their own
ethnicities. We first have to extract information about guests’ ethnicities. On the
website, we observe the first name of the last ten guests leaving reviews on each
listing and each wave. Since we do not use the pictures provided on each guest
profile, we are not able to identify black guests. To keep a consistent definition
for both hosts and guests, we restrict our analysis to the Arabic/Muslim minority
group.
For each listing, we regress the share of reviews written by guests with an
Arabic/Muslim first name on a dummy for the host ethnicity, controlling for
the location and the observable characteristics of the listing. In Table 7, we
find evidence for some ethnic matching: a host with an Arabic/Muslim first
name is 1 percentage point more likely to have a review from a guest with an
Arabic/Muslim first name. While minority hosts seem to receive more minority
guests, the magnitude of the difference shows that markets are far from being
segregated.
Table 7—Ethnic matching between Arabic/Muslim hosts and Arabic/Muslim guests





Note: OLS regression. Aside from the dummy Arabic/Muslim Host, controls include city-wave FE,
neighbourhood FE, block FE, property characteristics (see Appendix Table A4), log price, number of
reviews and ratings. Standard errors are clustered at the property level.
E. Are reviews ethnically biased?
Another way to explain our empirical results would involve the combination
of taste-based discrimination and ethnically-biased reviews. In this scenario, the
initial ethnic gap (among listings with few reviews) would reflect taste-based
discrimination. If reviews are ethnically biased, minorities would overall receive
lower ratings and worse reviews than majority listings with the same quality.
Therefore, minority listings with the same observables and the same ratings would
be of higher quality than majority listings. Prices of listings owned by minorities
conditional on observable characteristics and ratings would increase faster than
prices of majority listings.
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A key ingredient of this scenario is that reviews are ethnically biased. In this
subsection, we show that minority hosts do not receive significantly better or worse
reviews from minority guests than from majority guests. We read this result as
an argument against the hypothesis that reviews are biased. To investigate this
question, we must build, for each listing i and wave t, the ratings corresponding
to the new reviews between t and t− 1. This step is necessary because the rating
we observe at date t, r̄it, is the average rating over all the reviews obtained by
the listing until date t. We infer r̃it, the average rating over reviews obtained










it +Xitβ + µi + εit
where g̃mit is the share of guests between t− 1 and t that belongs to the minority
group and µi is a listing-specific fixed-effect. As in Section IV.D, we exclude
Blacks from the analysis because we are not able to identify them among the
guests. In this regression, γ can be interpreted as the difference between the
ratings given by minority and majority guests to minority listings. Restricting
the sample to observations with new guests between waves, Table 8 shows that
the coefficient of the interaction term is non-significant and small in magnitude:
minority guests do not seem to give better reviews to minority hosts.
Table 8—Average rating, depending on hosts’ and guests’ ethnicity
Average rating over reviews received between t− 1 and t
Share of minority among new guests 0.000
(0.025)




Note: OLS regressions with listings fixed-effects. The outcome is r̃it, the average rating over reviews
obtained between t− 1 and t. Aside from those mentioned in the Table, controls include city-wave FE,
and property characteristics (see Appendix Table A4). Robust standard errors clustered at the property
level.
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F. Ethnic differences in property upgrading
Minority hosts might react to lower demand by improving the quality of their
listing to a larger extent than majority hosts. In this case, we would also observe
that minority prices increase faster than majority ones. Hosts can upgrade their
property through both observable and unobservable characteristics.
We exploit the information about observable characteristics of a listing and test
whether minority hosts tend to change these observables in a way that improves
the perceived quality of their listing. First, we estimate a hedonic price regres-
sion: we regress the log-price on property characteristics, controlling for location
and city-wave fixed effects, on the majority population. We use the estimated
coefficients of this regression to predict the log-price corresponding to all proper-
ties for each period, as a function of the observables, p̂(Xit). Second, we use the










+ µi + εit
If minorities upgrade their properties more and sooner than their majority
counterparts, bm should be negative.
Upgrading may also come from characteristics that are not directly observable
by the econometrician. We test for this by looking at the differential evolution of
the word count of the listing description, the number of pictures displayed on the
listing’s page, and the number of pictures taken by a professional photographer.
We run a regression very close to the previous one, except that we now control










+ µi +Xitbx + εit
where Yit is the word count or the number of pictures of listing i at date t. Again,
we expect bm to be negative if minority hosts upgrade their properties more than
majority hosts.
Table 9 shows the results of the estimations of equations (7) and (8). In col-
umn 1, the point estimate of bm is significantly negative, but very small. This
suggests that upgrading on the observable characteristics plays a negligible role
in explaining our main results. In all other columns, the point estimates of bm
are small and insignificant. Minority hosts do not seem to have upgraded their
listings differentially from majority hosts, in terms of the listing description or
pictures.
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Table 9—Differential Upgrading
Pred. log-price Word count Pictures Pro. Pictures
5 stars ×f(K) 0.007*** 92.368*** 7.516*** 5.867***
(0.000) (3.028) (0.105) (0.102)
4.5 stars ×f(K) 0.007*** 80.547*** 6.400*** 4.788***
(0.000) (3.183) (0.097) (0.094)
4 stars ×f(K) 0.005*** 55.212*** 5.743*** 2.714***
(0.000) (5.635) (0.183) (0.166)
≤ 3.5 stars ×f(K) 0.003*** 30.629*** 5.359*** -0.096
(0.001) (8.808) (0.325) (0.318)
Minority ×f(K) 0.001** 7.503 -0.150 0.283
(0.001) (8.419) (0.299) (0.287)
Adj R2 0.995 0.218 0.082 0.206
N obs. 2,474,551 2,474,551 2,474,551 2,474,551
Note: OLS regressions of equations (7) and (8), using the estimated ρ̂ = 13.6 and f(K) = K
K+ρ̂
where
K is the number of reviews and ρ is the number of reviews that is necessary to make up for half of the
gap due to statistical discrimination. Stars represent the last known average ratings. Minority is an
indicator that identifies the minority host, i.e. mi = 1. Values in row Minority ×f(K) are estimates of
the coefficients on the term mi
Kit
Kit+ρ
. Under our assumptions, the interaction m× f(K) is an estimate
of −bm. In column 1, the outcome is the predicted log-price based on observable characteristics of the
listing. In column 2, the outcome is the word count of the listing description. In column 3, the outcome
is the number of pictures on the listing profile. In column 4, the outcome is the number of pictures
taken by professionals on the listing profile. On top of the covariates included in the table, we include
property/host characteristics (except in column 1). Robust standard errors clustered at the listing level.
G. Do minority hosts set prices that are too low initially?
Another way to rationalise our results is that minority hosts might be less famil-
iar of this market than majority ones. If minorities are initially more pessimistic
about the potential of their listings than majority hosts, they will set up lower
initial prices. As information about their quality comes back to them (through
reviews or the number of transactions), they would revise their prices up quicker
than the majority, which would generate differential dynamics in prices. This
would explain our empirical results without the existence of statistical discrimi-
nation.
This story entails that minority hosts should get more transactions initially
and that demand for ethnic listings should decrease with the number of reviews
relative to non-minority listings. We show that it is not the case. As we do not
directly observe the number of transactions, we use the number of new reviews
between two waves as a proxy. We estimate our non-linear model, using this
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where ∆Kit = Kt+1 −Kit. We want to measure whether minorities accumulate
more or less reviews (proxy for the number of transactions) as the number of
reviews increases. If minorities are over-pessimistic and learn about their type
gradually, we should observe that minorities have a more decreasing pattern of
the number of transactions per period, compared to majority hosts. In this case,
bm should be positive.
In Table 10, we find that the coefficient associated to minority hosts is negative
(which entails a positive bm), significant and small in the first column, insignificant
in the second column. Taken at face value, the magnitude of the first coefficient
suggests that minority hosts would initially get .02 reviews more than majority
hosts. While the sign of the coefficient is consistent with minorities being pes-
simistic about their perspectives on the website, the magnitude of the coefficient
suggests that it should be a minor contributor to the overall story.
Table 10—Ethnic differentials in the accumulation of reviews over time
∆K ∆ logK
5 stars ×f(K) 0.086*** -2.27***
(0.002) (0.026)
4.5 stars ×f(K) 0.071*** -2.27***
(0.002) (0.023)
4 stars ×f(K) 0.030*** -2.52***
(0.002) (0.036)
≤ 3.5 stars ×f(K) -0.005* -3.20***
(0.003) (0.073)
Minority ×f(K) -0.018*** -0.103
(0.005) (0.068)
Adj R2 0.409 0.199
N obs. 2,253,612 1,901,981
Note: OLS regressions of equation (9), using the estimated ρ̂ = 13.6 and f(K) = K
K+ρ̂
where K is the
number of reviews and ρ is the number of reviews that is necessary to make up for half of the gap due to
statistical discrimination. Stars represent the last known average ratings. Minority is an indicator that
identifies the minority host, i.e. mi = 1. Values in row Minority ×f(K) are estimates of the coefficients
on the term mi
Kit
Kit+ρ
. Under our assumptions, the interaction m × f(K) is an estimate of −bm. In
column 1, the outcome is the difference between two dates in the number of reviews. In column 2, the
outcome is the difference in the log number of reviews. On top of the covariates included in the table,
we include property/host characteristics. Robust standard errors clustered at the listing level.
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V. Conclusion
This paper documents that Airbnb hosts who belong to an ethnic minority
experience a 3% price penalty when differences in locations and observable char-
acteristics are accounted for. Taking advantage of the longitudinal nature of our
data, we show that the ethnic gap can be fully explained by statistical discrimi-
nation. About one quarter of the gap comes from differentials in average unob-
servable quality across groups. Three quarters can be attributed to the fact that
potential guests hold inaccurate beliefs about the average quality of properties
held by minority compared to majority hosts.
We can draw several conclusions from these findings. First, aside from the issues
inherent to any online feedback system, the one featured by this online platform
is effective in supplying useful information to potential guests. In the absence
of such a feedback system, the ethnic price gap would be higher than its current
value. Second, aside from gains in efficiency, improving the feedback system would
also contribute to reduce ethnic price gaps. Third, minority hosts are still largely
penalised by the existence of inaccurate beliefs that potential guests hold against
them, even though the review system mitigates their influence.
We believe that the evidence provided in this paper is relevant to the current de-
bate about discrimination on online platforms. While there is no reason to make
ethnicity particularly salient on these platforms, policies consisting in concealing
more information about actors’ identity may backfire if ethnic gaps are due to
statistical discrimination. We see our results as advocating another way to re-
duce ethnic gaps: disclosing more abundant and more reliable information about
candidates, sellers or hosts. As discussed by Shaw, Horton and Chen (2011),
it remains to understand how platforms can adequately incentivise reviewers to
provide informative, unbiased and relevant reviews. Further research is required
to understand how interventions on information disclosure affects ethnic gaps.
On Airbnb, like on many other online marketplaces, interactions between agents
are limited. While we have no evidence about how our results can generalise
to other platforms, online or not, they are consistent with those obtained by
Pallais (2014) and Agrawal, Lacetera and Lyons (2016) on the online platform
ODesk (now Upwork). Pallais (2014) finds that providing public information
about workers’ abilities has, on average, a positive effect on workers’ probability to
be hired. Agrawal, Lacetera and Lyons (2016) find that standardised information
about work performed on the platform disproportionately benefits less-developed-
country contractors, relative to developed-country ones. The approach we follow
in this paper may be adapted to study ethnic discrimination on several other
widely-used online platforms, including labour markets.
While our identification strategy allows us to pin down statistical discrimina-
tion (and the share of it that is due to inaccurate beliefs), we cannot disentangle
other factors like taste-based discrimination, ethnic differentials in characteristics
that are observable to potential guests but not to econometricians (e.g., pictures
contents), or in hosts’ opportunity cost of time. While statistical discrimination
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(and inaccurate beliefs) appears to explain most of the gap, taste-based discrim-
ination could be offset by differentials in characteristics, for instance. Therefore,
we cannot rule out the existence of taste-based discrimination on Airbnb. Another
caveat is that the analysis is made conditional on location. Because ethnic mi-
norities tend to live in neighbourhoods that are less valued by potential guests,24
minority hosts suffer in reality from larger price gaps than those computed con-
ditional on location.
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